A decoy-state protocol for quantum cryptography with 4 intensities of
  coherent states by Wang, Xiang-Bin
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
04
11
04
7v
5 
 2
1 
Fe
b 
20
05
A decoy-state protocol for quantum cryptography with 4
intensities of coherent light
Xiang-Bin Wang
IMAI Quantum Computation and Information Project,
ERATO, JST, Daini Hongo White Bldg. 201,
5-28-3, Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo 133-0033, Japan
Abstract
In order to beat any type of photon-number-splitting attack, we propose a protocol for quantum
key distributoin (QKD) using 4 different intensities of pulses. They are vacuum and coherent states
with mean photon number µ, µ′ and µs. µs is around 0.55 and this class of pulses are used as the
main signal states. The other two classes of coherent states (µ, µ′) are also used signal states but
their counting rates should be studied jointly with the vacuum. We have shown that, given the
typical set-up in practice, the key rate from the main signal pulses is quite close to the theoretically
allowed maximal rate in the case given the small overall transmittance of 10−4.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution(QKD) has drawn much attentions from scientists. Different
from the classical cryptography, quantum key distribution(QKD)[1, 2, 3] can help two re-
mote parties to set up the secure key by non-cloning theorem[4]. Further, proofs for the
unconditional security over noisy channel have been given[5, 6, 7, 8]. The security of prac-
tical QKD with weak coherent states has also been shown[9, 12]. However there are still
some limitations for QKD in practice, especially over long distance. In particular, large loss
of channel seems to be the main challenge to the long-distance QKD with weak coherent
states. A dephased coherent state |µeiθ〉 is actually a mixed state of
ρµ =
1
2pi
∫
2pi
0
|µeiθ〉〈µeiθ|dθ =
∑
n
Pn(µ)|n〉〈n| (1)
and Pn(µ) =
µne−µ
n!
. Here µ is a non-negative number. In practice, especially in doing long-
distance QKD, the channel transmittance η can be rather small. If η < 1 − e−µ − µe−µ,
Eavesdropper (Eve) in principle can have the full information of Bob’s sifted key by the
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack[11]: Eve blocks all single-photon pulses and part of
multi-photon pulses and separates each of the remained multi-photon pulses into two parts
therefore each part contains at least one photon. She keeps one part and sends the other
part to Bob, through a lossless channel.
If the channel is not so lossy, Alice and Bob can still set-up the unconditionally secure
final key with a key rate[12]
r = 1−∆−H(t)− (1−∆)H(t/(1−∆)) (2)
if we use a random classical CSS code[5] to distill the final key[12]. Here t is the flipping error
rate, ∆ is the fraction of tagged signals[12], i.e. the fraction for those counts in cases when
Alice sends out a multi-photon pulse. The functional H(x) = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x).
From the above formula we see that a tight bound for ∆ is rather important in both key
rate and the threshold of flipping rates.
It is possible to use single-photon source[10] in the next generation of practical QKD
after the technique is fully matured, but it seems not likely in the near future. Moreover, it
seems not to be the best choice from economic viewpoint. There are at least two realistic
methods so far: strong-reference-light[14] method and decoy-state method[16].
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Originally, the PNS attack has been investigated where Alice and Bob monitor only
how many non-vacuum signals arise, and how many errors happen. However, it was then
shown[15] that the simple-minded method does not guarantee the final security. It is
shown[15] that in a typical parameter regime nothing changes if one starts to monitor the
photon number statistics as Eve can adapt her strategy to reshape the photon number dis-
tribution such that it becomes Poissonian again. A very important method for was then
proposed by Hwang[16], where a method for unconditional verification of the multi-photon
counting rate (MPCR) is given. Using Hwang’s result, one can faithfully estimate the upper
bound of ∆ through decoy-pulses, given whatever type of PNS attack. The value of up-
per bound estimated there is much decreased than that in worst-case estimation. However,
Hwang’s method does not produce a sufficiently tight bound, though it is an unconditional
verification. For example, in the case of µ = 0.3, by Hwang’s method, the the optimized
verified upper bound of ∆ is 60.4%. With the value ∆ = 60.4%. As it was mentioned[16, 17],
one can combine the decoy-state method with GLLP[12]. By eq(2), the key rate must be
low in practice if we use the the bound value given by Hwang[16]. Latter, Lo and co-workers
studied the subject[17, 18]. However, their main protocol[17] seems to be inefficient in prac-
tice, because it requires infinite number of classes of different coherent states to work as
the decoy states. A detailed version of their main protocol has been presented recently[19].
Prior to Ref.[17], a simple idea of using vacuum and very weak cohernet states as decoy
states was shortly stated[18]:“On one hand, by using a vacuum as decoy state, Alice and
Bob can verify the so called dark count rates of their detectors. On the other hand, by using
a very weak coherent pulse as decoy state, Alice and Bob can easily lower bound the yield
(transmittance) of single-photon pulses.” This idea obviously works in the ideal case with
infinite pulses[17]. However, as we shall show it latter, given a very lossy channel and finite
number of pulses, the total number of counts of those very weak coherent states can be too
small to be useful for a faithful stastical estimation.
II. OUR PROTOCOL AND RESULTS
Recently, the author proposed an efficient decoy-state protocol[20] with vacuum and two
coherent states of µ, µ′ which are used for both decoy and signal. Here, we propose a modified
protocol which further improves the key rate. In the modified protocol, coherent states with
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average photon number µs is used for the main signal state. Coherent states with average
photon number µ, µ′ are used for both signal and decoy states( i.e., they are used as signal
states but their counting rates are also observed and used in the protocol.) Vacuum is used
only for testing. The main idea of this work is: According to the transmittance of the
physical channel, we first choose a reasonable value for µ, e.g. 0.1 or 0.22 and then find
a good value µ′ so that µ and µ′ will help to verify a satisfactorily value of transmittance
of single-photon pulses, s1. According to s1, we then choose the value µs so that the key
rate of main signal states is maximized. In a real protocol, Alice is supposed to calculate
these values according to the transmittance of physical channel in advance. Alice mixes
all classes of pulses and sends them to Bob and then verify the value of the single-photon
transmittance according to the counting rates of states of vacuum, µ and µ′. If the verified
value is too much smaller than the expected value, they give up the protocol. Our protocol
has the following properties: (1), The protocol uses only 4 classes of states. Except for
vacuum, all pulses have the reasonable intensity and all of them can be used as signal states.
(2), The protocol gives a key rate ranges from 77% to 88% of that of the theoretically
allowed key rate, given the overall transmittance of 10−4 or 10−3. (3), The protocol assumes
typical real-world set-ups of QKD in practice therefore it applies for real-world protocols
with coherent states. Let’s start from an estimation of the theoretically allowed maximum
key rate (TAMKR) with coherent states.
A. theoretically allowed maximum key rate
To see the TAMKR, we consider an ideal protocol:
Ideal protocol: Alice and Bob exactly uses Ns single-photon pulses to test the transmittance
and quantum bit error rate(QBER) of all single-photon pulses. The dark count is zero and
the channel transmittance is η. They use coherent states to generate the key. Suppose the
tested QBER is t′1 and then they can upper-bound the QBER of those single-photon states
in signal pulses by
t1 ≤ (1 + δ)t
′
1
. (3)
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They use coherent state with intensity µ to generate the key. According to eq.(2), the overall
key rate is
R = ηµ[1− 2H(t1)− (1− e
−µ)(1−H(t1))]. (4)
They may choose an appropriate value µ to maximize R. For example, given t1 = 0,
maximized value is R = ηµe−µ at the point of µ = 1. In this papeer, we shall consider the
typical case that the QBER is t1 = 0.03 and for this value the TAMKR is
RTAMKR = 0.149η (5)
with µ = 0.572.
B. elementary results
In our protocol, the BB84 or other quantum-bit states are encoded in each coherent pulses
(except for vacuum pulses.) What we shall study is not the BB84 state or other qubit state
for cryptography itself, we shall only study how to overcome the PNS attack. Alice switch the
intensity (mean photon number) of each pulse randomly among 4 values, 0, µ, µ′, µs. (These
values have nothing to do with BB84-state preparation. Except for vacuum, each pulses
caries a state randomly chosen from BB84-set and there is no relation between intessity
and the carried BB84-state in any pulse.) We first use the pulses with intensities of µ, µ′
to estimate a lower bound on the overall transmittance of single photon pulses and then
calculate the key rate of the main signal states by this lower bound. For simplicity, we
denote those pulses produced in state |µse
iθ〉, |µeiθ〉, |µ′eiθ〉, |0〉 as class Ys, Yµ, Yµ′ and Y0,
respectively. In the protocol θ is randomized. They observe the counting rates of each
classes so we regard s0, Sµ, Sµ′ , Sµs as known parameters and notations s0, Sµ, Sµ′ , Sµs are
counting rates for pulses in classes of Y0, Yµ, Yµ′, Yµs , respectively. They verify the lower
bound of single photon transmittance s1 using the measured values of s0, Sµ, Sµ′ . With s1
being verified, they can distill the final key from all classes of pulses except for Y0. Given
the transmittance, not all values of µ, µ′ will work same effectively. They should choose
appropriate values of µ, µ′ so that they can verify a large lower bound of s1. They should
also choose an appropriate µs so that the key rate of pulses in this class is maximized. That
is to say, there are two steps of optimization. First they need good values of µ, µ′ to verify
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lower bound of s1 tightly. Second, given s1, normally, neither µ nor µ
′ maximizes the key
rate, they need to use another intensity of states, µs as their main signal pulses. If there is
no Eve or Eve hides her presence, after the protocol they must be able to verify everything
as expected, and they can indeed obtain satisfactory results. If the verified results about
s1 is too much larger than what was expected, they give up the protocol. In this paper,
the calculation for choosing µ, µ′ is similar to my previous work[20], but we show something
more: after adding another class of coherent pulses Ys, the key rate of that class of pulses is
approaching the theoretically allowed value.
We first define the counting rate of any state ρ: the probability that Bob’s detector clicks
whenever a state ρ is sent out by Alice. We disregard what state Bob may receive here.
This counting rate is called as the yield in other literatures[16, 17]. For convenience, we
always assume
µ′ > µ;µ′e−µ
′
> µe−µ (6)
in this paper. Alice is the only person who knows which pulse belongs to which class. After
received all pulses from Alice, Bob announces which pulse has caused a click and which pulse
has not. At this stage, Alice has already known the counting rates of pulses in each of the
four classes, {Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ , Ys}. Their task is to verify the lower bound of s1, or equivalently,
the upper bound of ∆, the fraction of multi-photon counts among all counts caused by pulses
in class Yµ.
A dephased coherent state |µeiθ〉 has the following convex form:
ρµ = e
−µ|0〉〈0|+ µe−µ|1〉〈1|+ cρc (7)
and c = 1− e−µ − µe−µ > 0,
ρc =
1
c
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ)|n〉〈n|. (8)
Similarly, state |µ′eiθ〉 after dephasing is
ρµ′ = e
−µ′ |0〉〈0|+ µ′e−µ
′
|1〉〈1|+ c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
ρc + dρd (9)
and d = 1− e−µ
′
−µ′e−µ
′
− cµ
′2e−µ
′
u2e−µ
≥ 0. ρd is a density operator. (We shall only use the fact
that d is non-negative and ρd is a density operator.) In deriving the above convex form, we
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have used the fact Pn(µ
′)/P2(µ
′) > Pn(µ)/P2(µ) for all n > 2, given the conditions of eq.(6).
With these convex forms of density operators, it is equivalent to say that Alice sometimes
sends nothing (|0〉〈0|), sometimes sends |1〉〈1|, sometimes sends ρc, sometimes sends ρd and
so on, though Alice does not know which time she has sent out which one of these states.
In each individual sending, she only knows which class the sent state belongs to. We shall
use notations s0, Sµ, Sµ′, Sµs , s1, sc, sd for the counting rates of pulses in class Y0, Yµ, Yµ′, Ys,
pulses in single-photon state, pulses in state ρc and pulses in state ρd, respectively. Our
goal is simply to find a formula relating s1 or ∆ with the quantities of s0, Sµ, Sµ′ which are
known to Alice and Bob already. Given any state ρ, nobody but Alice can tell whether it is
from class Yµ or Yµ′ . Asymptotically, we have
sρ(µ) = sρ(µ
′) (10)
and sρ(µ), sρ(µ
′) are counting rates for state ρ from class Yµ and class Yµ′ , respectively.
The coherent state ρµ′ is convexed by ρc and other states. Given the condition of eq.(6),
the probability of ρc in state ρµ′ is larger than that in ρµ. Therefore we can make a prelim-
inary estimation of sc. From eq.(9) we immediately obtain
Sµ′ = e
−µ′s0 + µ
′e−µ
′
s1 + c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
sc + dsd. (11)
s0 is known, s1 and sd are unknown, but they can never be less than 0. Therefore we have
e−µ
′
s0 + µ
′e−µ
′
s1 + c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
sc ≤ Sµ′ . (12)
From eq.(7) we also have
e−µs0 + µe
−µs1 + csc = Sµ. (13)
Solving the above two constraints self-consistantly we have
∆ =
cSc
Sµ
≤
µ
µ′ − µ
(
µe−µSµ′
µ′e−µ′Sµ
− 1
)
+
µe−µs0
µ′Sµ
s1 =
1−∆− e−µs0/Sµ
µ
eµSµ. (14)
In particular, in the case η << 1 and there is no Eve., Alice and Bob must be able to verify
the following facts:
s1 = e
µ(1−∆)η + [(1−∆)eµ − 1]s0/µ (15)
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and, if we set µ′ − µ→ 0 we have
∆ =
µ
(
eµ
′
−µ − 1
)
µ′ − µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ′−µ→0
= µ (16)
in the protocol. (In eq.(16) we have set s0 = 0 for the clarity of the main issue. This is
close to the real value in the case of normal lossy channel, which is 1 − e−µ, given that
η << 1. From the above observation we can summarize two points: (1), Assymptotically,
µ, µ′ should be chosen close to each other so as to obtain a tight lower bound for s1. (2),
The over estimation of ∆ by our protocol is µ − (1 − e−µ) = µ2/2. Therefore, the smaller
µ is chosen, the tighter our verification of ∆, s1 is. However, we can not choose to set µ or
µ′−µ to be unlimittedly small in practice, otherwise the protocol is neither stable nor secure
due to the statistical fluctuation. The results above are only for the asymptotic case. In
practice, the number of pulses are always finite and negative effects from possible statistical
fluctuation have to be considered. Otherwise, the protocol is insecure. Before going into
details of such a task, we give an example to see why the fluctuation can cause serious
security problem if it is disregarded. Consider a toy protocol: Alice and Bob use single-
photon state as the decoy state to test s1 and use normal coherent state for key distillation.
Suppose the total number of pulses of decoy states is 105 and they find 20 clicks at Bob’s side
for all decoy pulses. If they conclude that s1 = 2× 10
−4 the protocol is very insecure: there
is substentially non-negligible probability that the real value of s1 for signal pulses is only
a half of that. Similar problem also occurs in the idea of Ref.[18] where very weak coherent
state[18] is used to replace the single-photon decoy state. Obviously, to lower bound the
value of s1 by observing the counting rate of the very weak coherent states, the mean photon
number µv of the very weak coherent states must be less than η. Suppose we use 10
10 pulses
for the decoy pulses of µv, then in average the total counts of the very weak coherent states
is µη < η2. Given channel transmittance of η = 10−4, in average, there would be only less
than 100 counts for the decoy pulses of very weak coherent states. This seems insufficient to
make a faithful stastical estimation for the true value of s1. Moreover, in practice, the dark
counts will make things even worse. Suppose they use a number of vacuum states class Y0
to test the dark count rate. Suppose in class Y0, the tested dark count rate is s0 = 10
−6.
Suppose there are 1010 pulses in class of very weak coherent state. In average, they should
find 10100 counts for this class, 10000 dark counts and 100 counts caused by the very
weak coherent states. However, this is only the values in average. In a specific realization,
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they will have no way to verify anything. For example, if they observe 10100 counts for
among 1010 pulses of very weak coherent states, there is a non-negligible probability that
all these counts are due to the dark counts only while the single-photon state counting rate
is actually zero. The idea[18] of using very weak coherent state as decoy state will require
an unreasonably large number of pulses for a faithful statistical estimation[21]. Besides the
issue of statistical fluctuation, exactly producing the expected very weak coherent states
itself can be technically difficult. Now we show how our protocol works in practical set-ups.
C. numerical results of the protocol
In practice, our task is stated as this: to verify a tight lower bound of s1 and the proba-
bility that the real value of s1 for signal pulses in any class being less than the verified lower
bound is exponentially close to 0.
The counting rate of any state ρ in class Yµ′ now can be slightly different from the counting
rate of the same state ρ from another class, Yµ, with non-negligible probability. We shall use
the primed notation for the counting rate for any state in class Yµ′ and the original notation
for the counting rate for any state in class Yµ. Explicitly, eq.(12,13) are now converted to

e−µs0 + µe
−µs1 + csc = Sµ,
cs′c ≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
(
Sµ′ − µ
′e−µ
′
s′
1
− e−µ
′
s′
0
)
.
(17)
Setting s′x = (1− rx)sx for x = 1, c and s
′
0
= (1 + r0)s0 we obtain
µ′eµ
[
(1− rc)
µ′
µ
− 1
]
∆ ≤ µeµ
′
Sµ′/Sµ − µ
′eµ + [(µ′ − µ)s0 + r1s1 + r0s0]/Sµ. (18)
In the left side, if µ′ and µ are too close, the factor of ∆ is very small. In the right side, if
µ′−µ is too small, term r1s1 will contribute effectively. Therefore, in practice, µ
′ and µ have
to be a bit different. The important question here is whether there are reasonable values
for µ′, µ so that our protocol can verify a tight lower bound of s1 even though the number
of pulses is finite. The answer is yes. Now the problem is actually this: given the normal
case that they have found Sµ = ηµ, Sµ′ = ηµ
′, (i.e., there is no Eve.), how tightly they can
lower bound s1. Given N1+N2 copies of state ρ, suppose the counting rate for N1 randomly
chosen states is sρ and the counting rate for the remained states is s
′
ρ the probability that
sρ − s
′
ρ > δρ is less than exp
(
−1
4
δρ
2N0/sρ
)
and N0 = Min(N1, N2). Now we consider the
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TABLE I: Verification of transmittance of single-photon pulse. We need the pulses in class
Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ for verification. Class Yµ or Yµ′ need 10
10 pulses and Y0 needs 2× 10
9.
η 10−3 10−3 10−4 10−4
s0 10
−6 2× 10−7 10−6 2× 10−7
µ 0.1 0.1 0.22 0.1
µ′ 0.27 0.26 0.48 0.35
s1/η 0.958 0.969 0.821 0.922
difference of counting rates for the same state from different classes, Yµ and Yµ′. To make a
faithful estimation for exponentially sure, we require δρ
2N0/sρ = 100. This causes a relative
fluctuation
rρ =
δρ
sρ
≤ 10
√
1
sρN0
. (19)
The probability of violation is less than e−25. To formulate the relative fluctuation r1, rc by
sc and s1, we only need check the number of pulses in state ρc, |1〉〈1| in each classes in the
protocol. That is, using eq.(19), we can replace r1, rc in eq.(17) by 10e
µ/2
√
1
µs1N
, 10
√
1
cscN
,
respectively and N is the number of pulses in class Yµ. From this we can also see that value
µ itself cannot be set too small, otherwise the total number of single-photon pulses is too
small therefore the fluctuation is severe. Since we assume the case where vacuum-counting
rate is much less than Sµ, we shall omit the effect of fluctuation in vacuum counting, i.e., we
set r0 = 0. With these inputs, eq.(17) can now be solved numerically. The verified bound
values of s1 are listed in the following table I. They are values that can be verified in the
case that there is no Eve (or Eve hides her presence). In obtaining those values, we first
choose a reasonable value for µ. According to µ, we choose an appropriate µ′ therefore a
tight bound for s1 is obtained. Next, we shall consider the QBER. For a fair comparison
of the ideal protocol and our protocol, we assume the same channel and the same device
for both protocol. Therefore the bit-flip part should be equal. The bound of phase-flip rate
of our protocol should be larger than that in the ideal protocol, because here we have to
assume all phase-flip errors have happened to the single-photon pulses. If the QBER in ideal
protocol is E, then the phase-flip in our protocol is
E ′ ≤ fE; f = eµη/s1. (20)
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TABLE II: Final key rate. The last raw is the ratio of key rate from main signal pulses and the
theoretically allowed maximal value. We have assumed the QBER for signal states in the Ideal
protocol is bounded by t = 3%. The number of pulses of in Ys can be any number larger than 10
10.
η, s0 10
−3, 10−6 10−3, 2× 10−7 10−4, 10−6 10−4, 2× 10−7
µ, µ′ 0.1,0.27 0.1,0.26 0.22,0.45 0.1,0.35
s1(µs)/η 0.958 0.969 0.821 0.922
µs 0.550 0.555 0.478 0.535
R/RTAMKR 88.0% 92.0% 57.3% 80.8%
Using eq.(2) we have the formula for key rate on class Ys:
Rs = Sµs [1−H(E)−H(fE)−∆s(1−H(fE))]. (21)
and Sµs is verified to be ηµs, E is the meassured error rate of the main signal pulses,
∆s = 1−
s1(µs)
η
e−µs . (22)
We shall assume that E is bounded by 3%, the same with t1 in the ideal protocol. The key
rates for class Ys in various cases is listed in table II.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed an efficient and feasible decoy-state method to do QKD
over very lossy channel. The key rate for the main signal pulses is around 57%− 92% of the
theoretically allowed maximal value. Our protocol uses vacuum and coherent states with
intensities of µ, µ′, µs. All coherent states can be used to distill the final key and µs is used
as the main signal pulses. As one may see from table I, the key rate of our protocol is rather
close to that of the ideal protocol. We believe the protocol shown here is the best choice
among all existing decoy-state protocols[16, 17, 18, 20].
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